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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-SPEEDY TRIAL CLAUSE-
The United States Supreme Court has held that the period of time
between the dismissal of military charges and a subsequent indict-
ment on civilian criminal charges should not be considered when
evaluating an accused's right to a speedy trial.
United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
Jeffrey MacDonald's pregnant wife and two children were mur-
dered on the night of February 17, 1970.1 The homicide occurred
in the family's home on the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, military
reservation where MacDonald, a physician, was serving as a cap-
tain in the Army Medical Corps.' The Army Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) considered MacDonald a suspect in the case and
restricted him to quarters on April 6, 1970.' After formally charg-
ing him under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)4 on
May 1, 1970, the Army appointed an officer to investigate the
1. United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1499 (1982). See MacDonald v.
United States (MacDonald I), 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 850 (1978), Mac-
Donald v. United States (MacDonald II), 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 635
F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
2. 102 S. Ct. at 1499. When the military police arrived, they found the three victims
dead and MacDonald unconscious from multiple stab wounds, one of which had caused a
collapsed lung. Id. Upon questioning, MacDonald alleged that three men and a woman had
gained entrance into his home while he was asleep. They stabbed and clubbed him into
unconsciousness, and when he awoke, he found his wife and two daughters dead. He called
the military police before losing consciousness again. Id. at 1499-1500.
3. Id. at 1500. MacDonald was relieved of all military duties, his telephone calls were
logged, and he was placed under the surveillance of an escort officer whenever he left his
quarters. 531 F.2d at 200 (MacDonald 1).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) art. 30, 10
U.S.C. § 830(a) (1976) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Charges and specifications shall be signed by a person subject to this chapter
under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to adminis-
ter oaths and shall state-
(1) that the signer has personal knowledge of or has investigated, the mat-
ters set forth therein; and
(2) that they are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Id. See also U.C.M.J. art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1976) which provides in pertinent part: "Any
person subject to this chapter charged with an offense under this chapter shall be ordered
into arrest or confinement, as circumstances may require .. " Id. See also U.C.M.J. art. 9,
10 U.S.C. § 809 (a), (d) (1976) which provides in pertinent part: "(a) Arrest is the restraint
of a person by an order, not imposed as a punishment for an offense, directing him to re-
main within certain specified limits. Confinement is the physical restraint of a person ....
(d) No person may be ordered into arrest or confinement except for probable cause." Id.
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charges.5 The investigating officer's report recommended that the
charges and specifications against MacDonald be dismissed, which
the Army did on October 23, 1970.6 Later that year, MacDonald
received an honorable discharge based upon hardship.
The CID continued its investigation of the murders at the re-
quest of the United States Justice Department and submitted a
thirteen volume report in June of 1972, followed by additional re-
ports submitted in November, 1972, and August, 1973.8 In August,
1974, the Justice Department presented its case to a grand jury,
who in January, 1975, returned an indictment charging MacDonald
with the three murders.
MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment prior to his trial in
federal district court10 on the grounds that the delay in bringing
him to trial violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.1"
Although the federal district court denied the motion,1 2 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed an interlocutory appeal
and reversed the district court's dismissal of the speedy trial claim,
holding that the delay did violate MacDonald's right to a speedy
trial.' s However, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
5. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. In accordance with military law proscribed by U.C.M.J. art. 30,
10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976), an article 32 hearing was conducted by the investigating officer. The
purpose of an article 32 hearing is to determine whether the suspect should be subjected to
court martial proceedings. The hearing is conducted similarly to a trial, as the government
and the suspect call witnesses and have the full right of cross examination. Generally, con-
siderable latitude in admitting evidence is allowed to both sides. See supra note 4. For a
further discussion of article 32 hearings, see generally E. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW §§ 319-20
(1976) and H. MOYER, JR., JusTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 2.425-.433 (1972).
6. 102 5. Ct. at 1500. The investigating officer concluded that the charges against Mac-
Donald were not true and recommended that civilian authorities investigate a named sus-
pect. 531 F.2d at 200 (MacDonald I).
7. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. MacDonald's discharge precluded any further proceedings
against him by the Army. Id. at n.3. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 1500.
9. Id.
10. Id. The federal district court had jurisdiction because the crimes were committed
on military property. Id. at n.4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 1111 (1976).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI which provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial..
I /d.
12. 102 S. Ct. at 1500.
13. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that MacDonald's freedom from detention or
bail during the interval between the termination of the article 32 proceedings and his arrest
after indictment did not, from a practical standpoint, dispel the effects of the government's
initial accusation. 531 F.2d at 204 (MacDonald I). For an analysis of the Fourth Circuit's
decision, see 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1981).
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rari and reversed the court of appeals on prematurity grounds."
MacDonald was tried in federal district court and convicted on
two counts of second degree murder and one count of first degree
murder."8 On appeal, the court of appeals followed its reasoning in
MacDonald I and again found that MacDonald's sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial had been violated and the indictment was
dismissed.' e The court also denied rehearing en banc.17 The United
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 8 and reversed the court of ap-
peals, holding that the interval of time between the dismissal of
military charges and a subsequent indictment on civilian criminal
charges was not relevant when considering whether the delay in
bringing an accused to trial violated his sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial."
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger 20 first examined
the pertinent language of the sixth amendment and concluded
that, under a literal reading of the speedy trial clause,2' protection
is only afforded after a formal accusation has been made and a
criminal prosecution has begun.2 Chief Justice Burger relied on
United States v. Marion,5 in which the Court held that the
speedy trial clause does not apply to the period before a defendant
is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused." The Chief
14. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). The Supreme Court held that the trial on the merits must be
completed before a criminal defendant can appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss on
speedy trial clause grounds. Id. at 863. See 102 S. Ct. at 1500.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. MacDonald was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life
imprisonment. Id.
16. 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980) (MacDonald II). At this trial, MacDonald claimed a
due process violation and raised issues involving conduct of the trial and rulings of the trial
judge, but the court of appeals declined to reach those issues. 102 S. Ct. at 1500-01 n.5.
17. 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980). The denial of rehearing was by an evenly-divided
vote. 102 S. Ct. at 1501.
18. 451'U.S. 1016 (1981).
19. 102 S. Ct. at 1501-03 (1982). The Court held that any analysis of MacDonald's
speedy trial rights should not be influenced by the evidentiary basis of the jury verdict. Id.
at 1501 n.6.
20. Id. at 1499. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1503.
21. See supra note 11.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 1501. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) where the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that the speedy trial guarantee does not apply to the time period
before an accused is arrested or indicted.
23. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
24. Id. at 313. The Court in Marion stated:
On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prose-
cution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been "accused" in the
course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to
those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover,
investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time. The Amend-
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Justice also explained that in addition to the period after indict-
ment, the period between arrest and indictment must also be con-
sidered in evaluating a speedy trial claim.25 He pointed out that
although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due
process claim under the fifth amendment, 2 or to a claim under any
applicable statutes of limitations, no sixth amendment right to
speedy trial arises until charges are pending.
2 7
Chief Justice Burger found that the speedy trial clause also has
no application after the government, acting in good faith, formally
drops charges.2 8 He stated that any undue delay after charges are
dismissed must be scrutinized under the due process clause, not
the speedy trial clause.2 9
The Chief Justice observed that the Court had identified the in-
terests served by the speedy trial clause in Marion.30 He stated
ment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will
move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposi-
tion of the charges against him.
Id.
In MacDonald, the government had relied heavily on the Marion opinion in its argu-
ment that MacDonald had no right to speedy trial protection for the time between the dis-
missal of the military charges and the civilian criminal indictment. See Brief for Petitioner
at 15, 25, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
25. 102 S. Ct. at 1501. See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975), in which
the Court determined that a defendant becomes an accused upon arrest or indictment, and
that his sixth amendment rights begin upon accusation. Id. at 65.
26. 102 S. Ct. at 1501. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
27. 102 S. Ct. at 1501.
28. Id.
29. Id. Justice Burger noted that the majority of the courts of appeals have held that
the time after the dismissal of an original charge is not protected by the speedy trial clause.
Id. at n.7. See Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (in a period after dismissal
of charges and re-arrest, the defendant was no longer an accused and had no speedy trial
right); United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978) (after dismissal of criminal
charges, defendant was not subject to the restraints of arrest, public obloquy, or disruptions
of employment, thus, he was not protected by the sixth amendment); United States v. Mar-
tin, 543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977) (the time period between
two separate indictments for the same charge did not count for speedy trial purposes, as
there was no indictment which could have been tried); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d
887 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (period of time between prosecutions did not count for speedy trial
purposes, as defendant was a free man against whom no prosectuion was pending).
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1501-02. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971), in
which the Court stated:
Inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a defendant's abil-
ity to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the
speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an ac-
cused's defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable
cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may
seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and
that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associa-
736
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that the purpose of the speedy trial guarantee was not primarily to
prevent prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time,31
but rather to reduce the magnitude of the hardships that an ac-
cused might suffer, such as incarceration prior to trial, restriction
of liberty while on bail, and disruption of life caused by the exis-
tence of pending criminal charges.3 2 Accordingly, the Chief Justice
found that once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial clause is no
longer applicable, as the formerly accused person is then in the
same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation. He
cannot be incarcerated, is not restricted by the requirements of
bail, and is no longer the subject of public accusation." Even when
there is a continuing investigation of the dismissed charges, the
formerly accused's position does not compare to that of a defen-
dant who is being held to answer a pending criminal charge. 4
Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the court of appeals deci-
sions in MacDonald I and I. The court of appeals had held that
criminal charges were essentially pending against MacDonald dur-
ing the entire period of time between his military arrest and his
subsequent indictment on civilian charges.35 The Chief Justice
found that once the Army had formally dismissed the charges
against MacDonald, he was free of government intervention into
his personal liberty.3 6 Even though the Army's investigation con-
tinued, MacDonald was in the same position as any other subject
of a criminal investigation, and his constitutional rights should be
evaluated as though no charges had ever been made.37 Accordingly,
tions, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his
friends.
Id.
31. Chief Justice Burger noted that this interest is primarily protected by the due
process clause and by statutes of limitations. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
32. Id.
33. Id,
34. Id. The majority conceded that a formerly accused could suffer stress and an inter-
ruption of his ordinary life, but that he would be in the same position as any party subject
to a criminal investigation who had not been officially accused. Id.
35. 531 F.2d 196, 204 (MacDonald I). The court of appeals determined that MacDon-
ald's military arrest initiated the protections of the speedy trial clause. Id. The Supreme
Court did not address the question of whether a military arrest is similar enough to a civil-
ian arrest or indictment to engage the protections of the sixth amendment because the gov-
ernment expressly declined to raise that issue on appeal. 102 S. Ct. at 1502-03 n.10.
36. Id. at 1503. The Chief Justice stated that MacDonald was free to practice
medicine and live his life as he chose. Id.
37. Id. The government argued that once the military charges were dismissed, Mac-
Donald was free from the pending charge as well as the anxiety, expense, and infringement
of liberty that accompanied the accusation. Accordingly, MacDonald was in the same situa-
1983
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Chief Justice Burger held that MacDonald had no claim regarding
a violation of his speedy trial right, as there was no period of gov-
ernment delay during the time he was subject to pending charges.38
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, 9 agreed with the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Marshall that MacDonald's speedy trial
right was not suspended during the time between the Army's dis-
missal of its charges and the subsequent civilian indictment.4' He
concluded, however, that the delay did not violate the speedy trial
clause, as the government must be allowed to proceed with caution
in prosecuting such a serious offense."'
In dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's view
that MacDonald's speedy trial right was inapplicable to the period
of time between the Army's dismissal of its charges and the return
of the civilian indictment.42 He further found that the majority's
conclusion was not justified by the language of the speedy trial
clause, the decisions of previous cases, or established speedy trial
policies.
Justice Marshall stated that because the majority had skipped
some relevant facts, it was necessary for him to review them in
more detail." He noted that the Army's investigation and prosecu-
tion of MacDonald was exhaustive, 45 and that the charges were dis-
missed because the investigating officer determined that they were
not true.4" However, the CID continued its investigation, which re-
sulted in the submission of its original report to the Justice De-
partment in June, 1972, almost two years after the military charges
against MacDonald had been dropped. 47 Justice Marshall further
tion as any person who is a suspect in a criminal investigation, and that situation does not
compare to a defendant who is formally charged and held to answer. Brief for Petitioner at
25, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
38. 102 S. Ct. at 1503. The Chief Justice noted that, by his own admission, MacDonald
conceded that any delay between the civilian indictment and trial was caused primarily by
his own legal manuevers. Id.
39. 102 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
41. 102 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joined Justice Marshall in dissent.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Participating in the initial investigation were the military police, the Army's
Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
local police. Id.
46. Id. Fifty-six witnesses testified in the course of the article 32 hearing. Id. See
supra note 5.
47. Id. 102 S. Ct. at 1504 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
738 Vol. 21:733
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noted that the CID undertook no significant new investigation into
the murders after submitting its original report, and that both the
United States District Attorney involved and the CID recom-
mended that the case be submitted to a grand jury soon after the
date of that report.48 Furthermore, MacDonald repeatedly re-
quested that the government complete its investigation and fre-
quently offered to be interviewed or questioned, but the Justice
Department commented only that the case would remain under ac-
tive investigation for the "foreseeable future.' ' 4' Finally, when the
government presented the case to a grand jury in August, 1974,50 it
offered no reasonable explanation for its delay in prosecuting after
the receipt of the June, 1972 report.5 1
Justice Marshall believed that the majority's analysis-that the
speedy trial clause offers no protection to a criminal defendant
during the period that a charge is not technically pending-was
too simple.5 2 He argued that this simplistic analysis had resulted in
disrespect for the language of the clause, important precedents of
the Court, and speedy trial policies.' He maintained that on its
face, the sixth amendment would seem to apply to one who has
been publicly accused, has obtained dismissal of the charges, and
has then been charged once again with the same crime by the same
sovereign." He argued that nothing in the language suggests that a
defendant must be continuously under indictment in order to ob-
tain a speedy trial right, but rather a natural reading of the clause
suggests that it continues to protect one who has been accused of a




48. Id. See 531 F.2d at 206-07 (MacDonald I).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1505 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See 531 F.2d at 207 (MacDonald I).
50. Justice Marshall noted that MacDonald waived his right to remain silent and tes-
tified before the grand jury for a total of more than five days. 102 S. Ct. at 1505 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). He indicated that numerous other witnesses testified, the bodies of the vic-
tims were exhumed, and the FBI reinvestigated certain aspects of the crime. Id.
51. Id. The dissenting justices noted that the court of appeals in MacDonald I had
found that the "leisurely pace" of the government was for its own benefit only and that the
district court had concluded that the case could have been brought before the grand jury




55. Id. MacDonald had argued that this was the correct reading of the sixth amend-
ment. According to this interpretation, all of the time after the Army's accusation on May 1,
1970 would have to be considered in evaluating MacDonald's claim that the government had
violated his speedy trial right. Brief for Respondent at 11, United States v. MacDonald, 102
S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
1983 739
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Justice Marshall stated that the majority's decision contradicted
previous Supreme Court cases dealing with the speedy trial
clause.5 In Klopfer v. North Carolina,5 7 the defendant was dis-
charged from custody and had no duty to report to the court, but
was subject to a reinstatement of the previous indictment upon the
prosecutor's application to the court.5 The Klopfer Court deter-
mined that this was an indefinite postponement of the govern-
ment's prosecution and concluded that it clearly violated the de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial even though no charges were
actively pending. Justice Marshall contended that the analysis
employed in United States v. Marion0 was consistent with the
Klopfer decision, as the Marion Court held only that the right to a
speedy trial does not accrue until a defendant is officially accused,
not that the dropping of the original charge terminates the defen-
dant's speedy trial protection. 1 Justice Marshall found that the
Marion Court did not address the question of whether a defendant
is in the same constitutional situation after criminal charges have
been dropped as he would have been if no charges had ever been
56. 102 S. Ct. at 1505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
58. Id. at 214. See 102 S. Ct. at 1505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). Justice Marshall noted that
the indictment was not dismissed under the "nolle prosequi" procedure ruled unconstitu-
tional in the Klopfer case. 102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He also indicated
that Klopfer teaches that the anxiety that an accused person suffers, even after his dis-
charge from custody because of a dismissal of prosecution, warrants the application of sixth
amendment rights. Id. The Klopfer Court stated that the defendant was not relieved of the
limitations placed upon his liberty merely because he was free to go anywhere he pleased, as
the pendency of the indictment might subject him to numerous hardships against which the
speedy trial clause was designed to protect. 386 U.S. at 222.
60. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307 (1971). MacDonald relied on the Marion opinion for his claim that his speedy trial
protection ran continuously from the date of the initial accusation against him. He argued
that he was arrested and publicly charged by the Army, and that the protections of the
speedy trial clause began at that time and continued through his civilian trial. Brief for
Respondent at 21, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
Justice Marshall indicated that the Marion Court had explained its holding by stating
that "the indictment was the first official act designating appellees as accused individuals."
102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.
That Court also found that sixth amendment provisions "would seem to afford no protec-
tion to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover,
investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time." Id. at 313 (empha-
sis added). Justice Marshall also stated that prior to the time of arrest or indictment an
accused may suffer anxiety, but he does not suffer the special form of anxiety engendered by
public accusation. 102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Recent Decisions
made."2
The dissenter pointed out that Marion had alluded to a serious
procedural impediment in extending the speedy trial right; inquiry
into when the police could have made an arrest or when the prose-
cutor could have brought charges would raise difficult problems of
proof.6 3 He found, however, that in a case of successive prosecu-
tions on the same charge, these difficulties do not exist, and there-
fore, the speedy trial right should attach from the date of the ini-
tial accusation, a date which is simple to determine.6 Justice
Marshall thus concluded that the majority's decision was not re-
quired by, and may be inconsistent with, prior cases.
6 5
Justice Marshall asserted that the majority had plainly ignored
fundamental speedy trial policies. He stated that the special anxi-
ety that a defendant suffers because of public accusation does not
disappear when the initial charge is temporarily dropped, espe-
cially when an investigation of the charge is continuing, leaving the
final resolution of the charge suspended.66 He claimed that because
this anxiety is recognized as a major purpose for the speedy trial
guarantee, the protection should have been available."
The dissenting Justice was sympathetic to MacDonald's situa-
tion subsequent to the dismissal of the Army's charges. 'He at-
tacked the statement made by the majority that MacDonald was in
the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation,
asserting that it is absurd to suggest that he suffered no more
anguish, interruption of life, or financial strain than if the military
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices noted that a
majority of the courts of appeals have held that the speedy trial clause provides protection
to the accused during the time after the dismissal of the initial charge. Id. at 1506 n.2.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977) (where defendants were arrested and had the charges dropped, but
were subsequently indicted on the same charge, the speedy trial guarantee accrued at the
date of the arrest and protected the defendants continuously from that time on); United
States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976) (in situations where arrest warrants were
dismissed, the speedy trial period is measured from the date of the original arrest); United
States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (where the government has shown bad faith,
the speedy trial period begins at the date of the original accusation).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1507 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id. MacDonald had argued that terminating his speedy trial protection at the time
the initial charge was dropped defeated the purpose of the speedy trial clause as it totally
ignored the continuing effect that the initial charge had upon him. Brief for Respondent at
10-12, 21, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
1983
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charges had never been brought." Justice Marshall further claimed
that there was no purpose served by ignoring the time after dismis-
sal of the initial charge.6 9 He also stated that the Court's previous
decision in Barker v. Wingo70 required that the Court use a balanc-
ing approach rather than an inflexible rule in deciding cases in-
volving a speedy trial claim. 1
The due process clause, contended Justice Marshall, does not
supply adequate protection to a defendant who is indicted a sec-
ond time on the same criminal charge. 72 He asserted that due pro-
cess constraints are limited in that the due process clause provides
protection only in cases of deliberate or tactical delay prior to an
indictment, as it was designed to allow the government to conduct
a relatively unrestricted pre-accusation investigation.s Justice
Marshall claimed that in cases where the government has already
investigated and accused a defendant, it should have to reinvesti-
gate and reprosecute within a reasonable period of time.74 Conse-
quently, failure to apply speedy trial protection after a charge has
been dropped not only causes the defendant to suffer the conse-
quences of the accusation without any protection, but presents a
situation where the government could delay indefinitely a second
prosecution for no reason. 5
Justice Marshall concluded that the application of MacDonald's
speedy trial right was not suspended during the time after the dis-
68. 102 S. Ct. at 1507 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the
charges caused MacDonald to incur legal expenses, to be subjected to public suspicion, and
to fear a subsequent prosection. Id. In his argument, MacDonald had contended that the
dismissal of the charge against him by the Army did not dispel the effects that the accusa-
tion had upon him. He claimed that he was constantly subjected to publicity and public
suspicion, that he was required to hire attorneys at his own expense for his continuing de-
fense, and that his life was disrupted interminably by the threat of prosecution. Brief for
Respondent at 10-12, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
69. 102 S. Ct. at 1507 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 1507-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972). See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall also noted that
lower court opinions indicated that the balancing approach could be "faithfully discharged"
in the special circumstances of successive prosecutions. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 & n.4 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Morris,
590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1977); United
States v. McKim, 509 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1975)).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has protection under
the due process clause only if the government's pre-indictment delay was intentional in or-
der to hinder the defense. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
74. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
Vol. 21:733
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missal of the Army's charges and before the civilian indictment."
He then considered whether the delay in bringing the civilian pros-
ecution violated MacDonald's speedy trial right"7 by employing the
balancing test enunciated by the Court in Barker v. Wingo7 s to the
facts surrounding the twenty-six month period of time between the
June, 1972, issuance of the CID report and the convening of the
grand jury in August, 1974.3 In so doing, he contended that the
government's delay was long and unjustified,80 that MacDonald
undeniably had asserted his sixth amendment right,81 and that
MacDonald had suffered substantial prejudice. 82 Justice Marshall
also asserted that it was possible that MacDonald suffered actual
prejudice because of the government's delay, as certain witnesses
could have testified differently or more effectively had the trial oc-
curred closer to the date of the murders.83 He concluded that Mac-
Donald had suffered the consequences of the initial charge during
the entire period of time after its dismissal, and that his speedy
trial right was violated by the unreasonable delay in investigating
and prosecuting him. 4
76: Id.
77. Id. at 1509 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices found this question to
be close. Id.
78. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the Court decided that the question of whether a
defendant's speedy trial right was violated can only be answered by reviewing the facts of
each case on an ad hoc basis, weighing the accused's rights against the government's con-
duct. The Barker Court found that the major factors in a speedy trial issue are the length of
the government's delay, the reasons for that delay, the defendant's assertion of his speedy
trial right, and the prejudice involved. Id. at 530-33. See infra notes 98-103 and accompany-
ing text.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1509 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. The delay was more than two years long and neither the district court nor the
court of appeals found a legitimate reason for the delay. Id. See generally 531 F.2d 196, 206
(MacDonald I) and 632 F.2d 258, 262 (MacDonald II).
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1509 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that MacDon-
ald frequently and vigorously asserted his speedy trial right. Id.
82. Id. Justice Marshall noted that MacDonald had suffered various forms of substan-
tial prejudice, including anxiety, financial expense, and continuing interruptions of his pri-
vate life during the twenty-six month delay. He also noted that proof of actual prejudice to
an accused's defense is not necessary to maintain a speedy trial claim. Id. See Moore v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), which held that the possibility that the defense was prejudiced
is the appropriate standard under the Barker analysis.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that mem-
ory loss occurs over time and that the coaching of witnesses prior to their testimony may
have had a greater impact on the defense and its use of cross-examination since the trial was
delayed for such a long period of time. Id.
84. Id. at 1510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall recognized that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in investigating a charge which has been dismissed and that
such investigation should be carefully undertaken, but contended that unjustifiable delays
cannot be tolerated when the defendant is enduring hardships caused by the initial charge.
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Although the speedy trial clause of the United States Constitu-
tion has been in existence since 1791,85 the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed it infrequently, with most of the cases construing the
clause occurring within the past fifteen years. An early interpreta-
tion was provided in 1905 in Beavers v. Haubert,8 in which the
Court ruled that the right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative,
as it depends upon the facts and circumstances involved in each
case. 7 The Beavers Court further found that the clause secures
rights to a defendant, but does not preclude the rights of public
justice.8
More recently, in United States v. Ewell,8" the Court reaffirmed
Beavers and further clarified the purpose of the speedy trial
clause, stating that the clause is to prevent unnecessary incarcera-
tion before trial, to minimize the anxiety and concern that is
caused by public accusation, and to limit the likelihood that delays
between accusation and trial will hinder the accused's defense. 0 In
the following year, the Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina"' held
that the sixth amendment standards are rendered obligatory upon
the individual states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. The
Klopfer Court also noted the various hardships imposed on the
criminally accused, including subjection to public scorn, employ-
ment interruptions, and the creation of anxiety and concern relat-
ing to the charges.2 The Court reasoned that those hardships re-
quire that the government not delay in bringing trial against the
criminally accused.93
In response to continued litigation involving the speedy trial
clause in the lower courts, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Marion.e4 That case involved a delay of approximately
He also asserted that suspending the availability of the speedy trial guarantee during the
time between successive prosecutions serves no legitimate government interest and disre-
gards the continuing effect that the initial charge has upon the defendant. Justice Marshall
further contended that the majority's opinion was "a disappointing exercise in strained logic
and judicial illusion" which misconstrues the individual's right to a speedy trial. Id.
85. See supra note 11.
86. 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
87. Id. at 87.
88. Id.
89. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
90. Id. at 120. The Court noted that statutes of limitations are usually considered to
be the primary guarantee against the bringing of stale criminal charges. Id. at 122.
91. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
92. Id. at 222-26.
93. Id.
94. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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three years between the commission of the crime and the date the
government formally charged the accused.95 The Marion Court
found that the sixth amendment had no application to pre-indict-
ment delays, as the fifth amendment's due process clause and ap-
plicable statutes of limitations provide protection in those cases.9"
The Court concluded that the speedy trial clause is activated only
upon the initiation of a criminal prosecution and provides protec-
tion only to those accused in that prosecution. The Marion Court
ruled that it is either a formal indictment or information, or else
an actual arrest and holding, that initiates the protections of the
speedy trial provision.
97
One year later, Barker v. Wingo" was decided. The Court stated
that one of the major purposes of the speedy trial clause is to
guard against inordinate delays between public charge and trial,
and held that speedy trial protection can only be determined on an
ad hoc basis by weighing the accused's rights against the govern-
ment's conduct in the particular instance. 99 According to the
Barker Court, the major considerations involved in resolving the
issue include the length of the delay,100 the reason for the delay,101
the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, 02 and prejudice
to the defendant.' After the Barker case, eleven years passed
before the Supreme Court again addressed the speedy trial clause
in MacDonald. 4
95. Id. at 308.
96. Id. at 323-24.
97. Id. at 320. The Marion Court also declared that the protections of the speedy trial
clause apply only to those citizens who have suffered a restraint on their liberty or have
been the subject of public accusation. The possibility that delays prior to trial could
prejudice the defendant does not activate his speedy trial right. Id. at 325-26.
98. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
99. Id. at 530. The Court discussed the unique character of the speedy trial right -
calling it "vague, amorphous, and slippery." Id. at 521-22. Therefore, in the Barker Court's
opinion, only by the use of a balancing approach can cases hinging on the speedy trial right
be fairly decided. Id. at 530.
100. 407 U.S. at 530. The Barker Court concluded that the length of the delay is the
triggering mechanism to cause an inquiry into the other pertinent factors. Id.
101. Id. at 531. The Barker Court explained that the various reasons which the gov-
ernment assigns to the delay should be given different weight by the Court. For example,
deliberate delay to hamper the defense should weigh heavily against the government, while
a valid reason (such as a missing witness) would justify a reasonable delay. Id.
102. Id. The Barker Court emphasized that failure to appropriately assert the speedy
trial right would harm the defendant's cause in subsequently claiming a violation of that
right. Id. at 532.
103. Id. The Barker Court stated that prejudice should be assessed in light of the
interests that the speedy trial right seeks to protect. Id.
104. 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982). Apparently the Supreme Court determined that it was
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The holding in MacDonald is that the period of time between
the dismissal of an original criminal charge and a .subsequent in-
dictment on the same charge is not considered when evaluating an
accused's right to a speedy trial.""' This holding is difficult to fully
reconcile with the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the
purposes of the speedy trial clause, and the public policy of the
justice system.
The majority relied almost exclusively on the Marion case in rul-
ing that no speedy trial right exists unless formal charges are
pending.106 Although the Klopfer case was noted by Chief Justice
Burger, it was factually distinguishable because it contained an un-
constitutional nolle prosequi procedure not present in MacDon-
ald.10 7 However, the balancing approach formulated in Barker'0 s
was not even mentioned, leaving the consideration involved in
weighing the rights of the accused against the government's con-
duct unresolved. Even the majority's use of the Marion case is dif-
ficult to reconcile with that opinion, as the Marion Court does not
specifically hold that the dropping of the original charge ends the
defendant's speedy trial protection.' 0'
The majority opinion can be viewed as being at odds with the
established purpose of the speedy trial rule, as it denied sixth
amendment protection to MacDonald even though he continuously
suffered the consequences of the original accusation. All of the re-
cent Supreme Court cases have stated that the major purpose of
the speedy trial clause is to reduce the unfavorable effects that
public accusation has upon the criminal defendant.'10 Denying
speedy trial protection to MacDonald on the technical grounds
that there were no pending charges refuses to recognize that the
consequences of a criminal accusation do not disappear when the
necessary to more clearly define the speedy trial right, as the courts had been faced with
numerous cases involving speedy claims resulting in inconsistent decisions in the courts of
appeals. See supra notes 25 and 62.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 1501.
106. Id. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. 102 S. Ct. at 1502 n.8. Under this procedure, the prosecutor was able to indefi-
nitely suspend the proceedings on the indictment, and could activate the charges and have
the case restored for trial at his will. Id. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
108. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
109. This position was advanced by MacDonald and accepted by the dissenting jus-
tices. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
110. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404.
U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); United States v.




The MacDonald decision is also difficult to explain on public
policy grounds because there are important conflicting concerns. If
an accused's speedy trial right continues to run after the charges
against him have been dismissed, such dismissals would be dis-
couraged, as prosecutors would be induced to try all cases immedi-
ately rather than dismissing the charges and losing any subsequent
trial on speedy trial grounds. The result would be that in cases
where dismissal pending further investigation would be appropri-
ate, there would be both unnecessary trials of innocent defendants
as well as acquittals of guilty defendants who might have been con-
victed if additional investigation was possible." 2 If, however, the
period of time protected by the speedy trial clause is not measured
from the date of the original accusation, the prosecution could cir-
cumvent the speedy trial requirement by continually dismissing
and reinstituting the same criminal charge against the same defen-
dant. Delays in bringing a defendant to trial as a result of this ap-
proach will produce detrimental effects upon the administration. of
justice and the correctional system 15
The closeness of the question of whether the speedy trial clause
is applicable to the time period between the dismissal of an initial
charge and a subsequent indictment on the same crime is apparent
from the division of the Court in MacDonald."" Nevertheless, it is
likely that the effect of MacDonald will be limited because prose-
cution of most crimes is governed by a statute of limitations which
greatly reduces the potential for prosecutorial delay. Therefore, de-
lays in prosecutions are already severely restricted regardless of
the MacDonald holding.
David G. Henry
111. This view was held by both MacDonald and the dissenting justices. See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
112. See Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497
(1982).
113. See Brief for Respondent at 24-25, United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497
(1982). Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion also discussed the potential for government
abuse under the majority's decision. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Although only Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in Justice Marshall's dis-
sent, Justice Stevens agreed with the dissenters that MacDonald's right to a speedy trial
was not suspended during the time period between the Army's dismissal of its charges and
the return of the civilian indictment. 102 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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